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Schutzman: Rhode Island v. Innis

COMMENT
RHODE ISLAND v. INNIS
Amendment-Interrogation in violation of Miranda includes not only direct questioning but also conduct police officers knew or should have known would elicit an
incriminatingresponse. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Fifth

In Rhode Island v. Innis,' the Supreme Court explored the
meaning, left unresolved by Miranda v. Arizona,2 of what constitutes interrogation in a custodial setting. By defining interrogation
not merely as express police questioning, but as "words or actions
on the part of police officers that they should have knoum were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response," 3 the Court in
Innis has afforded a suspect considerably more protection than had
previously been given in a majority of jurisdictions. 4 Moreover,
Rhode Island v. Innis may mark a deviation from the Burger
scope of the fifth amendment
Court's recent trend of restricting the
5
self-incrimination.
against
privilege
1. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 446 U.S. at 302 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
4. See notes 53-57 infra and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Burger, The Unprivileged Status of the Fifth Amendment Privilege,
15 Am.Cmis. L. REV. 9 (1978); Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the
Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 518 (1977);
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99.
Recognizing the Burger Court's dramatic shift in the field of criminal procedure, Professor Chase maintains that the Court has been concerned with convicting the
"factually guilty" at the expense of protecting the individual from improper police
conduct. After reviewing post-Miranda cases, a pattern of constitutional analysis
emerges:
[I]f reliable evidence in a criminal case establishes the probability that the
defendant has committed the act with which he is charged, constitutional
rules that operate to exclude the evidence, or to taint it, will be strictly construed or narrowed, and constitutional rules that operate to preserve the evidence will be liberally construed or expanded.
Chase, supra, at 520. For a critique of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
(incriminating statements made in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach testimony of defendant), see Dershowitz & Ely, Harrisv. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J.
1198 (1971).
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Regarded by many as the Warren Court's most important
criminal procedure decision, 6 Miranda ushered in a new era in the
law of confessions by guaranteeing a suspect in custody the right to
remain silent and consult with counsel before being questioned by
police. 7 The Supreme Court's decisions after Miranda defined and8
clarified such issues as what constitutes waiver of Miranda rights
and the custodial situation which Miranda safeguards. 9 However,
the most important and troublesome issue that the Miranda decision left unresolved-what constitutes interrogation in a custodial
setting-did not receive Supreme Court attention for fourteen
years. When certiorari was granted in Rhode Island v. Innis,10 the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to define fully interrogation
within the meaning of Miranda."
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in
Rhode Island v. Innis. The first section reviews the law prior to
Innis, with particular emphasis on lower court decisions which defined interrogation in the absence of a Supreme Court standard.
The second section's analysis of Innis itself focuses upon the
Court's definition of what types of police conduct constitute custo6. For discussions of the impact of Miranda on criminal procedure, see
Edwards, The Effects of "Miranda" on the Work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 159 (1967); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogationin Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH.
L. REV. 1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical
Study, 29 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1 (1967); Project-Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
7. 384 U.S. at 444.
8. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (after suspect has asserted right to
remain silent, Miranda does not per se preclude further questioning). For a brief
discussion of the issue of waiver of Miranda rights, see note 79 infra.
9. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493-96 (1977) (per curiam) (suspect who
voluntarily entered police station to be questioned, who was not placed under arrest,
and who was allowed to leave voluntarily was not in custody, even though he was
falsely told that his fingerprints were found at scene of crime); Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (statements made and records received during I.R.S.
interview at home and at place of business of taxpayer admissible because taxpayer
was not in custody). For a brief review of the issue of custody, see note 22 infra.
10. 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
11. See 446 U.S. at 297. While Miranda and its progeny have been extensively
debated in legal literature, some of the more notable works of interest are 3 J.
WIGMOmR, EVIDENCE §§ 821-826b (rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1970); Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV.
671 (1968); Kamisar, A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59
(1966); Warden, Miranda-Some History, Some Observations, and Some Questions,
20 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1966).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss2/14

2

Schutzman: Rhode Island v. Innis
1981]

CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION REDEFINED

dial interrogation and criticizes that definition on the ground that

the test as adopted may be an unworkable standard. The last section suggests an alternative approach by clarifying the definition of
custodial interrogation and constructing workable criteria for lower
court guidance. In addition, it proposes a standard for police procedure which may alleviate the difficulties inherent in a custodialinterrogation setting.
MIRANDA TO INNIS: WHAT IS CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION?

In Miranda, the Court extended the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination beyond judicial proceedings to incustody police questioning. 12 To insure that the fifth amendment
12. 384 U.S. at 439. The development of confession law has had a long history
in English and American jurisprudence. For historical surveys, see 3 J. WIOMORE,
supra note 11, §§ 817-822; Kemp, The Background of the Fifth Amendment in English Law: A Study of its HistoricalImplications, 1 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 247 (1958);
Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against SelfIncriminationin America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
The traditional common law theory was based on evidentiary principles and excluded coerced confessions as unreliable and untrustworthy. See, e.g., 3 J. WIGMORE,
supra, § 822, at 330. Prior to Miranda, with the exception of Brams v. United States,
168 U.S. 532 (1897), the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause was not applied
to invalidate coerced confessions; rather, a due process voluntariness standard was
utilized. See, e.g., M. BERGER, TAIUNG THE FIFTH 99-126 (1980). Thus, until

Miranda was decided in 1966, a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was
fully protected at trial but had not yet been applied to in-custody police interrogation
prior to trial. Id. at 126. The following observation was made:
Those who generations from now set out to write the history of our legal institutions will puzzle over a framework of criminal justice, which, during a
public trial before an impartial judge with defense counsel present to give
aid, will not suffer the defendant to be asked a single question without his
consent. And yet that same legal system will condone the relentless questioning in secret at all hours of the day and night of that same defendant
with only those whose duty it is to ensnare him to determine where the line
between fair and foul is to be drawn. This is a tragic indictment of contemporary society. The preaching of one thing and the practicing of another is
often one of the first warnings of social decay.
Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO.
L.J. 1, 25-26 (1958); see Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1964). The various policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination are
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that selfincriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses;
our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load" . . . ; our respect for the in-
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privilege is fully protected, the Court established procedural safeguards to alleviate the coercive atmosphere inherent in custodial
interrogation. 13 Thus, the Court ordered that, prior to any questioning, a suspect "must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed."' 14 Any incriminating statements15
that are not preceded by Miranda warnings and are a product of
in-custody police questioning are inadmissible in the prosecution's
direct case.16
violability of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life" . . . ; our distrust of selfdeprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted). See generally Schiller, On the Jurisprudenceof the Fifth Amendment Right to Silence, 16 AM.
CraM. L. REv. 197 (1979); Schrock, Welsh & Collins, InterrogationalRights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1978).

13. The coercive atmosphere inherent in custodial interrogation exerts pressure
on a suspect to utter incriminating statements and thus endanger his or her fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 461. "An individual
swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic
forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion .. . cannot be otherwise than
under compulsion to speak." Id. The reading of the Miranda warnings was intended
to dispel the compulsion inherent in a police-dominated atmosphere. Id. at 469.
Whether these procedures have in fact had this effect has been the subject of intense
debate. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
14. 384 U.S. at 444.
15. Incriminating statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, are inadmissible in the prosecution's direct case. The Court stated in Miranda:
No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no
distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory." If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact,
statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often
used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the
statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication.
These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and
may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for
any other statement.
Id. at 476-77. But see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (statements by
witness discovered as result of statements by defendant obtained in violation of
Miranda are admissible).
16. 384 U.S. at 444; see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (incriminating
statements made in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach testimony of defendant).
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Once the Miranda warnings are given, a suspect may waive
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently. 1 7 However, if the suspect asserts "in any manner
and at any stage of the process"' 8 his or her right to remain silent
or requests that an attorney be present during questioning, "the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."' 19
Miranda's underlying concern is the effect of custody and in20
terrogation on the will of a suspect:
It is this combination of "custody" and "interrogation" that
creates-and, in the absence of "adequate protective devices,"
enables the police to exploit-an "interrogation environment"
designed to "subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner." It is this combination-more awesome, because of the interplay, than the mere sum of the "custody" and "interrogation"
components-that produces the "interrogation atmosphere," "interrogation . . .in a police dominated atmosphere," that "carries

its own badge of intimidation," that "exacts a heavy toll in individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals," and
that is so "at odds" with the privilege against compelled selfincrimination.

21

17. 384 U.S. at 475; see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); note 79 infra.
18. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
19. Id. at 474. The fifth amendment Miranda right to counsel is different and
distinct from the sixth amendment right to counsel. The Miranda right to counsel
was also intended to dispel the coercive atmosphere inherent in custodial interrogation. The Court observed in Miranda:
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate
very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege
by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today.
384 U.S. at 469. The Miranda right to counsel serves other "significant subsidiary
functions" such as:
If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel
can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the
likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion
is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence
of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate
statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the
prosecution at trial.
Id. at 470 (citation omitted).
20. 384 U.S. at 461.
21. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 63-64 (1978) (emphasis in original)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting 384 U.S. at 445, 455-58, 465 (emphasis mainly in original)).
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Thus, where a suspect is not in custody, the coercive atmosphere
is not sufficient to require Miranda safeguards. 22 At the same time,
even though a suspect is in custody, "[a]ny statement given freely
and voluntarily without any compelling influence is . . . admissible
' 23
in evidence."
Miranda defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initi-

ated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 2 4 While Miranda did recognize that methods other

than direct questioning, such as psychological ploys and police
22. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam); Beckwith
v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). The question of whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes is the "most litigated issue in the field of 'custodial interrogation,"' Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes
Custodial Interrogation?,25 S.C. L. REV. 699, 706 (1974), and courts have adopted
various tests. Under the "focus test" derived from Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), an individual is in custody when the "investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect ..... Id.
at 490. Most jurisdictions, however, have rejected the focus test and define custody
in terms of whether the "individual's freedom of action has been significantly restrained." Smith, supra, at 710. In making this determination, courts have adopted
both subjective and objective tests. The subjective test focuses on the perceptions of
the suspect and examines whether the "individual interrogated believed himself to
be in custody." Id. The objective test focuses on whether, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable man would believe he is deprived of his freedom of action at
the time of police questioning. Id. at 712-14; see United States v. Kennedy, 573
F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir.
1978).
Some jurisdictions have combined the above tests in determining whether an individual is in custody and analyze whether the investigation has focused on the suspect, whether the suspect believed he was in custody, and whether the police subjectively intended the individual to be in custody. See, e.g., United States v.
Martinez, 565 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Nash, 563 F.2d 1166, 1168
(5th Cir. 1977). Most jurisdictions, however, have adopted the objective test. Smith,
supra, at 712.
23. 384 U.S. at 478. The relevant language is:
In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not
purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The
fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not
whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings
and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement
that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he
wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of
any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is
not affected by our holding today.
Id. (footnote omitted).
24. Id. at 444 (footnote omitted).
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trickery, may constitute interrogation, 25 the Court did not construct a test to determine what kinds of police conduct are the
equivalent of interrogation. 2 6 Decisions in the wake of Miranda
clarified and finetuned the definitions of custody 27 and waiver 2 8 but
did not do so for interrogation. As a result, federal and state courts
attempting to determine if a suspect's Miranda rights had been violated often reached confusing and sometimes contradictory conclusions as to what conduct constitutes police interrogation in a custo29
dial situation.
This confusion was not alleviated and may have been heightened by the Court's decision in Brewer v. Williams. 30 In Brewer,
the defendant, after having been arraigned and advised by his lawyer not to speak without the lawyer present, made incriminating
statements in response to what is now known as the "Christian
burial speech," 3 1 a police monologue where the defendant was told
25. See id. at 448-52, where the Court reviews the numerous methods employed by police to induce a confession. See generally White, Police Trickery in
Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581 (1979).
26. Why the Miranda Court failed to define interrogation fully has been the
subject of some speculation. Smith argues that "[p]erhaps the Miranda Court was reluctant to define completely 'custodial interrogation' before experience revealed the
exact scope of the problem with which the definition would be concerned." Smith,
supra note 22, at 702 (footnote omitted).
27. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493-96 (1977) (per curiam); Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976).
28. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
29. For example, jurisdictions disagree about whether arranging a confrontation between co-defendants constitutes interrogation, compare Commonwealth v.
Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971) (arranging confrontation between defendant and accomplice who accused defendant of committing the crime constitutes interrogation) with People v. Doss, 44 Ill. 2d 541, 256 N.E.2d 753 (1970) (arranging
confrontation between defendant and accomplice who tells defendant to reveal location of weapon does not constitute interrogation), and about whether reading a codefendant's statement to the defendant constitutes interrogation. Compare Howell v.
State, 5 Md. App. 337, 247 A.2d 291 (1968) (per curiam) (reading accomplice's statements to defendant does not constitute interrogation), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 907
(1969) with Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973) (reading accomplice's statement implicating defendant to defendant constitutes interrogation).
30. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
31. Williams, the defendant, was arrested and arraigned in Davenport, Iowa, for
kidnapping a 10-year-old girl in Des Moines. Id. at 390-91. After turning himself in,
the defendant was advised by his lawyer not to talk to the police about the
kidnapped girl. Id. at 391. On the return trip to Des Moines, the detective began a
conversation with the defendant and delivered the now famous Christian burial
speech. Id. at 392. The detective, knowing that Williams was a deeply religious
escapee from a mental institution, addressed him as "Reverend" and said:
"I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down
the road.... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's
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that the victim's body had to be found before the snow covered it.
The court held that the defendant's statements directing the police
to the body were inadmissible because the police remarks, although not phrased as a question, deliberately sought to elicit an
incriminating response. 32 Many jurisdictions, looking for guidance
as to what constitutes interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda, cited Brewer as the standard. 33 Brewer, however, did
not involve the fifth amendment privilege protected by Miranda;
rather, Brewer was decided on the ground that the police cannot
deliberately elicit incriminating information in the absence of an attorney after the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel35 has
attached, 34 that is, once judicial proceedings have commenced.

raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is
poor, it's going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several
inches -of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person
that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have only been
there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to
find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des
Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of
this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who
was snatched away from them on Christmas [Elve and murdered. And I feel
we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning
and trying to come back after a snow storm and possibly not being able to
find it at all."
Id. at 392-93 (ellipsis in original) (brackets in original). As they approached Des

Moines, Williams directed the police to the body of the young girl. Id. at 393.
The Court determined that, in light of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964), Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel had attached at arraignment. 430
U.S. at 399. The Court held that the incriminating statements were inadmissible because the police deliberately sought to elicit an incriminating response after
Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel had attached. Id. at 399-401. See generally Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at the Discomfiting Record, 66 GEo. L.J. 209 (1977).
32. 430 U.S. at 400.
33. E.g., State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978), vacated and remanded sub
nom., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); United States v. Jordan, 557 F.2d
1081, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1977) (statement by police officer that he was informed that
defendant is carrying sawed-off shotgun constitutes interrogation); United States v.
McCain, 556 F.2d 253, 256 (5th Cir. 1977) (statement by customs agent that defendant's life in danger if drugs inside body cavity constitutes interrogation).
34. 430 U.S. at 400.
35. The Court has held consistently that the sixth amendment right to counsel
does not attach until the moment formal judicial proceedings are instituted. E.g.,
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no right to counsel at lineup before
arraignment); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (no right to counsel at taking
of writing samples after arrest but prior to indictment); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel attaches at post-indictment lineup); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (right to counsel violated when government
agents deliberately elicited incriminating information after indictment).
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There are fundamental differences between the protection afforded by the sixth amendment and that provided by the procedures outlined in Miranda.36 The sixth amendment right to counsel, the right with which Brewer was concerned, prohibits the
police from interrogating a defendant once formal judicial proceedings have commenced "whether or not he is in custody and
whether or not he is aware that he is dealing with a government
agent."37 Miranda procedures, on the other hand, are designed to
protect a suspect before judicial proceedings are instituted, in
those custodial situations where the compulsion to confess may be
present. 38 Questioning which would violate the sixth amendment
because formal judicial proceedings have begun is not a violation of
the fifth amendment right to counsel if the suspect is not in custody. Thus, the fact that the police statements in Brewer were held
to be a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right did not
necessarily mean that the same statements would be interrogation
in violation of Miranda.

Nevertheless, without noting that Brewer's holding had specifically involved the sixth amendment,3 9 more than one court used
Brewer as the standard in deciding whether a custodial suspect had
been interrogated in violation of the fifth amendment. 40 For example, in United States v. McCain,4 ' the Fifth Circuit adopted Brew-

er's "deliberately elicited" test and applied it to a fifth amendment
Miranda case. In that case, McCain was taken to a search room
after the customs inspector had observed her and determined that
she fit a drug courier profile. 42 A strip search was conducted by
43
two female customs inspectors but failed to produce narcotics.
After the search, Agent Korzeniowski handed the defendant a
booklet containing newspaper clippings which reported the tragedies of people who had attempted to hide narcotics in their body
36. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980); Kamisar, supra note 21,
at 63-69.
37. Kamisar, supra note 21, at 63; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201

(1964).
38.

384 U.S. at 461.

39. 430 U.S. at 397-98.
40. See cases cited note 33 supra.
41. 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1977).
42. Id. at 254. The "drug courier profile" consists of seven primary and four
secondary characteristics the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration believes are
common among drug couriers. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1979).
43. Id.
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cavities. 4 Furthermore, Agent Korzeniowski told the defendant
that "these were very serious matters, that she could harm herself
seriously, perhaps even cause her death, if she were in fact carrying contraband in her body and if any of these containers ruptured
and this narcotic substance was in immediate contact with her body
or her interlial organs." 45 McCain responded
that she was carrying
46
narcotics in her body and removed them.
Relying in part on Brewer, the court of appeals stated that unless police conduct evidences a deliberate attempt to elicit an
incriminating response, it is not interrogation within the meaning
of Miranda.47 Applying this test to the case at bar, the court held
that even though the agent was acting out of concern for the health
and safety of the defendant, 48 the agent's remarks were a deliberate attempt to elicit an admission that she had narcotics within her
body and thus were tantamount to an interrogation under
Miranda.49 The Fifth Circuit, in utilizing the Brewer deliberately
elicited test, was applying a sixth amendment right-to-counsel
standard to a fifth amendment custodial-interrogation case without
noting that the rights involved in the two situations are not always
identical.
Further evidence of the difficulties caused by the Supreme
Court's failure to formulate a definition of what constitutes interrogation in a Miranda setting is found in the variety of standards
used by federal and state courts. A minority of jurisdictions have
adopted a test which does not rely on the intentions of the police,
but on the likely result of police conduct. Thus, "any question
likely to or expected to elicit a confession constitutes 'interrogation,' "50 and any statements elicited will not be admissible in the
prosecution's direct case. In these jurisdictions, arranging a confrontation between co-defendants, 51 or reading to the defendant a
confession made by a co-defendant 52 is the equivalent of interrogation because it is conduct that is likely to or expected to elicit an
incriminating response. Other jurisdictions have adopted a "tech44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 256.

48. Id.
49. Id.

50.

Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 227, 252 A.2d 575, 579 (1969).

51. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971).
52. E.g., Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss2/14

10

Schutzman: Rhode Island v. Innis
19811

CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION REDEFINED

nicar ' 53 approach in defining interrogation and require a direct
question by police. In these jurisdictions, showing a defendant
physical evidence, 54 reading a ballistics report to the defendants, 55

reading a confession made by a co-defendant, 56 or arranging a confrontation between co-defendants 57 does not constitute interroga-

tion because the police did not question the suspect.
The Supreme Court's failure to define interrogation has resulted in lower court confusion in determining what constitutes in-

terrogation. Consequently, Rhode Island v. Innis provided the
Court with an opportunity to fully define interrogation within the

meaning of Miranda.
RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS:

INTERROGATION DEFINED

On January 17, 1975, Thomas Innis was arrested for the robbery and shotgun murder of a taxicab driver near a school for

handicapped children in Providence, Rhode Island. 58 Innis, who
was unarmed at the time of his arrest, 59 was advised of his
Miranda rights by the arresting officer. 60 Within minutes, a police

sergeant and a captain arrived at the scene and each advised Innis
of his rights under Miranda.61 In response to the last set of
Miranda warnings, Innis requested to speak with an attorney. 62

53.

Kamisar, supra note 21, at 21.

54. E.g., United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 953 (1976).

55. E.g., Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 82 (Ky. 1969), rev'd sub noma.
Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972).

56. E.g., Fellows v. State, 12 Md. App. 206, 283 A.2d 1 (1971); Howell v. State,
5 Md. App. 337, 247 A.2d 291 (1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 907 (1969).
57. People v. Doss, 44 Ill. 2d 541, 256 N.E.2d 753 (1970).
58. State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158, 1160 (R.I. 1978), vacated and remanded sub
noma. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). Innis was picked up by a taxi on
January 12, 1975, in Providence, Rhode Island. The body of the cabdriver was found
on January 16, 1975, and the cause of death was a shotgun blast to the back of the
head. Id. On January 16, 1975, another cabdriver informed the police that he bad
been robbed by a man with a sawed-off shotgun. Id. at 1168 (Kelleher, J.,
dissenting, joined by Joslin, J.). While at the police station, the cabdriver identified
his assailant from a picture posted on the wall which subsequently led to Innis' apprehension in the early morning of January 17, 1975. Id. at 1171 (Kelleher, J., dissenting, joined by Joslin, J.).
59. 446 U.S. at 294.
60. Id. Innis was arrested at gunpoint. Brief of the Respondent at 4, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Briefi.
61. 446 U.S. at 294.
62. Id. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights a total of three times prior to requesting an attorney. Id.
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The captain directed that Innis be placed in a police wagon 63 and

taken to headquarters by Police Officers Gleckman, McKenna, and
Williams. 64 The captain further ordered the police officers not to
question or coerce Innis in any way.65

While enroute to headquarters, 66 Officers Gleckman and
McKenna began a conversation concerning the missing shotgun.
Officer Gleckman testified, "''"At this point, I was talking back

and forth with Patrolman McKenna stating that I frequent this area
while on patrol and there's a lot of handicapped children running
around this area, and God forbid one of them might hurt themselves." ' "67 Officer McKenna agreed with Officer Gleckman,
stating that he "'"more or less concurred with . . . [Gleckman]
that it was a safety factor and that we should, you know, continue

to search for the weapon and try to find it."' '"68 Officer Williams
did not participate in the conversation but testified that"

'

"[Gleck-

man] said it would be too bad if the little girl-I believe he said
little girl-would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself." ' "69 Upon
hearing the conversation, Innis told the officers that he would show
them where the shotgun was hidden. 70 The police returned to the
scene of the arrest where a search for the shotgun was being conducted and, once again, advised Innis of his Miranda rights. 71
Innis led the police to the location of the shotgun. 72

At trial, the court found the incriminating statement by Innis
to be a valid waiver of his Miranda rights and therefore admissible,

without determining whether the weapons conversation constituted

63. Id. A police wagon is indistinguishable from a patrol car except that it has a
wire mesh screen dividing the front seat from the rear. Brief, supra note 60, at 5 n.2.
64. 391 A.2d at 1160. This procedure was somewhat unusual. See notes 124-125
infra and accompanying text.
65. Apparently, this warning was not heard by Innis because he was already
seated in the police wagon. Brief, supra note 60, at 16 (citing App. Rec. at 35, 46).
66. There was conflicting testimony by the officers concerning the exact seating
arrangement in the police wagon. 446 U.S. at 294 n.1; 391 A.2d at 1160 n.2; Brief, supra note 60, at 5 n.3.
67. Brief, supra note 60, at 5-6 (quoting App. Rec. at 43-44 (quoting Officer
Gleckman)).
68. Id. at 6 (brackets in original) (quoting App. Rec. at 53 (quoting Officer
McKenna)).
69. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting App. Rec. at 59 (quoting Officer
Williams)).
70. 391 A.2d at 1160.
71. Id. at 1161.
72. Id.
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interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.73 The shotgun and
incriminating statements were subsequently admitted at trial, and
74
Innis was convicted of murder, robbery, and kidnapping.
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court set aside the
conviction and ordered a new trial. 75 Relying in part on Brewer v.
Williams,"7 the court held that Innis was subjected to "subtle compulsion" which is the equivalent of interrogation and therefore a violation of Miranda.77 The court reasoned that "[p]olice officers in
such a situation must not be permitted to achieve indirectly, by

446 U.S. at 296. The trial judge said:
"In the automobile, driving along Chalkstone Avenue, we have three officers who are out at four in the morning, or later, and have been prowling
around searching for a weapon which they had reason to believe was there.
The weapon was either loaded or with shells. It is in the area of a school
where when daylight arrives handicapped and retarded children will be
coming to the area. I think it is entirely understandable that they would
voice their concern to each other. And I have to say that I commend the defendant for responding to the danger which, more than likely, he did not
know of up until that time. There is no reason for me to believe, and no evidence on which I should conclude, that he was familiar with the area and
the type of facilities that were there. So the defendant responded out of a
very commendable concern to a situation that he became acquainted with. I
commend him for it. He responded and then said: 'Turn around, take me
back and I will show you where the weapon is.'
"It was a waiver, clearly, and on the basis of the evidence that I have
heard, an intelligent waiver, of his right to remain silent. And for whatever
reason, whatever motivates people, as long as it is not the result of threat or
coercion, it is a waiver for all purposes, and the weapon was found."
391 A.2d at 1163 (quoting Shea, J., of Del. Super. Ct.).
74. 391 A.2d at 1167.
75. Id.
76. The Rhode Island Supreme Court incorrectly relied on Brewer v. Williams
in determining whether the weapons conversation was tantamount to interrogation.
446 U.S. at 300 n.4. This incorrect application of Brewer is understandable because
jurisdictions utilizing the deliberately elicited test in defining interrogation had
relied on Brewer, see text accompanying notes 39-49 supra, and the facts of Innis are
remarkably similar to the facts of Brewer:
Both Williams and Innis were informed of their right to the assistance of
counsel. Moreover, both defendants revealed the location of a critical piece
of evidence while being transported in a police vehicle; and both statements
were elicited not by direct police questioning but rather by conversation
which apparently convinced each defendant that for humanitarian reasons
the evidence in question should be revealed.
White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of his Right
to Counsel, 17 AM. Caim. L. REv. 53, 54 (1979) (footnotes omitted). There are significant differences between Brewer's sixth amendment right to counsel and Miranda's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See text accompanying notes
36-38 supra.
77. 391 A.2d at 1162.
73.
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talking with one another, a result which the Supreme Court has
said they may not achieve directly by talking to a suspect who has
been ordered not to respond. The same 'subtle compulsion' exists." 78 Although the court did not expressly adopt a standard to
judge whether or not the weapons conversation was tantamount to
interrogation under Miranda, it relied in part on Brewer and held
that the weapons conversation was intended to elicit an incriminating response, thus suggesting they adopted the Brewer deliber79
ately elicited test.
For the first time since Miranda was decided in 1966, the
United States Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis was confronted with the opportunity of fully defining what kinds of police
conduct constitute interrogation. 80 Writing for the Court, 81 Justice

78. Id.
79. Id. at 1161-62. The court held that once Innis had been subjected to interrogation he did not waive his Miranda rights by making an incriminating statement.
Id. at 1163-64.
Under Miranda, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the defendant
"knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to retained or appointed counsel." 384 U.S. at 475. Moreover, after Miranda
warnings are given, a waiver will not be presumed merely from the silence of the
suspect or because a confession was elicited, id.; rather, "[a]n express statement that
the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed
closely by a statement could constitute a waiver." Id.
In Innis, the court of appeals concluded that Innis' request to see an attorney
prior to questioning was inconsistent with the finding of a valid waiver. 391 A.2d
1163. Furthermore, Innis did not expressly waive his Miranda rights nor did he retract his initial request for counsel. Id. at 1163-64. Having found that Innis was subjected to interrogation and that he had not waived his Miranda rights in the police
wagon, the court held that the evidence was tainted by the initial illegality despite
the fact that Innis was warned of his Miranda rights prior to disclosing the location
of the shotgun. Id. at 1164. But see Judge Kelleher's conclusion that the Miranda
warnings given after the weapons conversation purged the primary taint of the illegal
interrogation. Id. at 1172 (Kelleher, J., dissenting, joined by Joslin, J.). The Supreme
Court did not address the issue of waiver in Rhode Island v. Innis because the Court
found that Innis had not been interrogated. 446 U.S. at 298 n.2.
80. 446 U.S. at 297. "We granted certiorari to address for the first time the
meaning of 'interrogation' under Miranda v. Arizona." Id.
81. In defining interrogation the majority adopted an objective test qualified by
subjective factors, id. at 300-02, and held that the conversation between the police
officers in Innis' presence was not interrogation. Id. at 302-04. Justice White
concurred by concluding that Innis had waived his rights. Id. at 304 (White, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, but rejected the test
adopted by the majority on the ground that it will confuse, rather than clarify, what
is permissible police conduct. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan in dissent, agreed with the majority's
definition of interrogation, but refused to accept the majority's application of the test
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Stewart concluded that Innis had not been subjected to interrogation within the meaning of Miranda and reversed the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island.82 After reviewing the policies underlying
Miranda,8 3 the majority set out to define interrogation. Recognizing that there are numerous techniques of persuasion in addition to
express questioning, 84 the Court held that Miranda safeguards are
activated whenever a suspect "in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent."85 The Court further
defined the functional equivalent of interrogation as "words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."86
Applying the test to the facts of the case, the Court found that
the conversation in the police car consisted of "offhand remarks"
to the facts of the case. In the dissenters' opinion, Innis was subjected to interrogation as defined by the majority. Id. at 305-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, J.).
Justice Stevens dissented by rejecting the majority definition of interrogation as
too narrow and argued that interrogation includes any police statement or conduct
"that has the same purpose or effect as a direct question. Statements that appear to
call for a response from the suspect, as well as those that are designed to do so,
should be considered interrogation." Id. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. The majority expressly rejected the Rhode Island Supreme Court's reliance
on Brewer in determining whether Innis had been subjected to custodial interrogation:
There is language in the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
this case suggesting that the definition of "interrogation" under Miranda is
informed by this Court's decision in Brewer v. Williams.... This suggestion
is erroneous. Our decision in Brewer rested solely on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel ....That right, as we held in Massiah
v. United States, . . .prohibits law enforcement officers from "deliberately
elicit[ing]" incriminating information from a defendant in the absence of
counsel after a formal charge against the defendant has been filed. Custody
in such a case is not controlling; indeed, the petitioner in Massiah was not
in custody. By contrast, the right to counsel at issue in the present case is
based not on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, but rather on the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted in the Miranda opinion. The
definitions of "interrogation" under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term "interrogation" is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context,
are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two
constitutional protections are quite distinct.
Id. at 300 n.4 (brackets in original) (citations omitted) (citing Kamisar, supra note 21,
at 41-55). The majority adopted Professor Kamisar's analysis of the differences between the sixth amendment right to counsel and Miranda's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
83. 446 U.S. at 297-300.
84. Id. at 298-99.
85. Id. at 300-01.
86. Id. at 302 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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not directed to Innis and therefore did not amount to express questioning. 87 Furthermore, since Innis was not distraught, nor was
there any indication that Innis was "peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children," 8s the confession cannot be said to have been the product of
"words or actions on the part of police officers that they should
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."89 Therefore, the weapons conversation between the two
police officers did not amount to interrogation within the meaning
of Miranda.
The Innis Test
The Innis Court's definition of interrogation is guided by an
objective test that also focuses in part on the perceptions of the
suspect.90 A court applying the Innis test must follow a three-step
analysis. The initial inquiry is whether the suspect has been subjected to express questioning. 91 If a court finds that to be the case,
the remainder of the test does not apply. Thus, after a suspect who
is in custody is given his Miranda warnings, any express questioning by police is a violation of Miranda9 2 and absent a valid
waiver, any incriminating statements will be inadmissible in the
prosecution's direct case. 93 If police conduct does not amount to
express questioning, the next step consists of applying an objective
94
test which also encompasses subjective factors.
The Innis Court defined the functional equivalent of interrogation as "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 95 This part of the test entails a two-part
analysis. The language "words or actions . .. that the police should

96
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response"
implies an objective foreseeability test. Courts applying this

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 302 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 300-01.
Id.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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standard must determine if it was foreseeable that police words or
actions would elicit an incriminating response. 97 If a court finds
that the police should have known that their conduct would elicit
an incriminating response, the conduct constitutes interrogation
within the meaning of Miranda.98 Absent a valid waiver by the
suspect, any incriminating statements will be inadmissible in the
prosecution's direct case. 99
The Court qualified the foreseeability standard by stating that
"[a]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual
susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion
might be an important factor in determining whether the police
should have known that their words or actions were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."'100 A
court applying the Innis test must determine if the police had any
specific knowledge concerning the susceptibility or suggestibility of
a particular suspect to a given form of conduct or persuasion. 1 1
Such specific knowledge may indicate that the police should have
known their conduct would elicit an incriminating response.' 02 For
example, if in Innis the police had known that Innis would be susceptible to an appeal to save the life of a handicapped child, it

97.
98.

Id. at 301-02.
For criticism of the jurisdictions that have adopted the deliberately elicited

test and technical approach in defining interrogation and have advocated an objective test almost identical to the Innis reasonably-likely-to-elicit test, see Graham,
What is "Custodial Interrogation?": California's Anticipatory Application of
Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 59, 104 (1966); Kamisar, supra note 21, at
83; Rothblatt and Pitler, Police Interrogation:Warnings and Waiver-Where Do We
Go From Here?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 479, 486-87 n.42 (1967) (citing Remarks of
Yale Kamisar at Escobedo-The Second Round Conference, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
July 23, 1966).
99. 446 U.S. at 301-02.
100. Id. at 302 n.8.
101. Id.
102. This part of the Innis test focuses on the perceptions of the suspect, id. at
301, and encompasses any factors that would render a particular suspect susceptible
to a given form of persuasion. Id. at 302 n.8. This part of the test is also consistent
with the views of those scholars who have suggested that the perceptions of a suspect are an important consideration in determining whether police conduct
compelled an incriminating response. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540,
544 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970); Kamisar, supra note 21, at 63;
White, supra note 76, at 62.
However, a test that relies solely on a particular suspect's perceptions to determine whether police conduct compelled an incriminating response would render
most, if not all, confessions inadmissible at trial.
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would have been foreseeable that the weapons conversation would
elicit an incriminating response.' 03
The Innis Test: An Unworkable Standard
The definition of interrogation in Innis overrules the majority
of jurisdictions that have defined interrogation solely in terms of intentional police conduct' 04 or direct questioning of a suspect.1 05 As
a consequence, the Innis test will most likely be welcomed by
those who have criticized the Burger Court's narrowing of Miranda
in the last decade.' 0 6 However, while the test appears to provide a
broad definition of interrogation, the vagueness of the standards set
forth to guide police conduct may serve to increase the confusion
and ambiguities in custodial-interrogation settings. The application
of the test to the facts of Innis itself exemplifies this problem.
In Rhode Island v. Innis the Supreme Court attempted to
construct a test that would ease the difficulties lower courts have
had in determining what types of police conduct constitute interrogation. Instead of articulating a simple definition guided by clear
standards, what emerged is a test which may be unworkable in actual practice. One weakness of the Innis test is the Court's failure
to enumerate the specific factors that may have a bearing on a particular suspect's susceptibility to a given form of persuasion. While
the Court did state that Innis was not "unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest,"'10 7 indicating that one factor may be
the emotional state of a suspect at the time of arrest, the opinion is
silent as to any additional subjective factors.
Furthermore, the Court did not enumerate the factors to be
examined in determining whether the police should have known
that their words or actions would elicit an incriminating response.
While the Court did state that "the entire conversation appears to
have consisted of no more than a few offhand remarks"108 and that
"[this is not a case where the police carried on a lengthy harangue
in the presence of the suspect, "'109 indicating that one factor may
be the length of the conversation between the officers in the pres-

103.
104.

446 U.S. at 302.
See notes 39-49 supra and accompanying text.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
See note 5 supra.
446 U.S. at 302-03.
Id. at 303.
Id.
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ence of a suspect, the majority opinion is silent as to any additional
factors.
The Supreme Court's failure to elaborate on which factors
a court should examine in applying the Innis test will result in
lower court confusion in determining whether the police should
have known that their conduct would elicit an incriminating response. Since the Innis decision, lower courts applying the test
have held that showing a suspect a police report,"10 confronting a
defendant with a co-defendant's confession,"' or informing a suspect that this story cannot possibly be true"i2 is conduct the police
should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. In these situations, where police conduct is intentional
and direct, lower courts have had little difficulty in applying the
Innis test.
However, lower courts have not as yet been confronted with
difficult situations such as those where police confront a suspect indirectly"13 or where a police officer initiates a conversation with another officer in a suspect's presence. In these situations of indirect
contact, the Innis test is unworkable because the definition of interrogation is not guided by clear standards. How is a court to determine whether the police should have known that their conduct
was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response? The objective foreseeability standard qualified by subjective factors is a
fact-sensitive test which requires for its correct and consistent application an accurate re-creation of the custodial confrontation between a suspect and police."14 Inherent in custodial situations,

110. In re Durand, 406 Neb. 415, 293 N.W.2d 383 (1980).
111. Commonwealth v. Brant, [1980] Mass. Adv. Sh. 1473, 406 N.E.2d 1021,
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 545 (1980).
112. People v. Bodner, 75 A.D.2d 440, 430 N.Y.S.2d 433 (4th Dep't 1980).
113. An example of indirect contact would be where police do not expressly
question or confront a suspect but rather use ambiguous words or actions. In such a
situation it is difficult to ascertain whether a reasonable police officer should have
known his or her conduct would elicit a response.
114. For a determination of whether the police should have known that their
words or actions would reasonably elicit an incriminating response, there must be an
accurate and detailed re-creation of the custodial confrontation. There were a number of discrepancies in the re-creation in Innis which could have been significant to
the outcome of the case. See notes 136, 146 infra. Moreover, for the subjective part
of the Innis test to work, a court must delve into the particular suspect's traits to determine whether he or she would be susceptible to a given form of conduct or persuasion. 446 U.S. at 302 n.8. Without a detailed and accurate re-creation at trial of
the custodial confrontation between a suspect and police, the Innis test will be
factually untrustworthy and difficult to apply correctly.
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however, are factors which make accurate re-creations difficult, if
not impossible, since in most cases the only witnesses are the individuals involved: the police officer and the suspect.
For example, in Innis, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
thought the police conduct was a deliberate attempt to elicit an
incriminating response."15 Yet, the United States Supreme Court
held that the police could not have known that their conduct was
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."16 Although
both courts examined the trial record, they disagreed as to the intentions of the police concerning the weapons conversation.117
The United States Supreme Court held that the police could
not have reasonably known that their conversation was likely to
elicit an incriminating response from Innis."18 The Court relied on
two factors: First, at the time of arrest, Innis was not distraught or
"unusually disoriented;" 119 second, the police could not reasonably
have known that Innis would be susceptible to a moral appeal
"concerning the safety of handicapped children."' 120 As the
dissenters point out, however, it "verges on the ludicrous" for the majority to believe that an appeal to save the life of a handicapped child
could not be expected to elicit an incriminating response unless the
police knew that Innis was susceptible to such an appeal: 12 "One
can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a
suspect-any suspect-than the assertion that if the weapon is not
found... an innocent child-a little girl-a helpless, handicapped
little girl on her way to school" will be killed.' 22
115. 391 A.2d at 1162.
116. 446 U.S. at 302-03.
117. Lower courts applying the Innis test to similar factual circumstances will
also come to different and therefore inconsistent results. Furthermore, Innis failed to
enumerate the specific factors that may have a bearing on a particular suspect's susceptibility to a given form of persuasion, leaving lower courts without a standard.
118. 446 U.S. at 302-03.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 302.
121. Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). Justice
Marshall, joined by Brennan, readily adopts the majority's definition of interrogation,
but is "utterly at a loss" to understand the application of the test to the facts of the
case. "I firmly believe that this case is simply an aberration, and that in future cases
the Court will apply the standard adopted today in accordance with its plain meaning." Id. at 307 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.); accord, id. at 314-16
(Stevens, J.,dissenting).
122. Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.)(emphasis in
original). Police deception in inducing a confession has had a long history and has
been addressed by the courts in various ways. For a review of the case law, see 3 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 841.
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Examination of the record could lead one to conclude that the
police conduct was a deliberate attempt to elicit an incriminating
response from Innis. 123 Glecknan, the officer who initiated the
weapons conversation, was directed by Captain Leyden to assist
Officers McKenna and Williams in accompanying Innis back to police headquarters. 124 Officer McKenna testified at trial, however,
that the usual procedure is to assign two officers to a police
wagon. 125 Why did Captain Leyden assign a third officer,
126
Gleckman, to accompany a handcuffed, unarmed, and subdued
Innis back to headquarters? The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that this was part of a deliberate attempt to elicit an incriminating
12 7
response from Innis, through an appeal to his conscience.
Another issue, beyond the scope of this paper, is raised by the Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure, where the reporter expressly left the issue of police deception to the courts. A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARBAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT, Commentary § 140.4, at 356 (1975). However, "[tihe one

exception is that ...deception which undermines the warning issued to an arrested
person that he is not obligated to make a statement is explicitly barred." Id. That exception states that "[nHo law enforcement officer shall attempt to induce an arrested
person to make a statement by indication that such a person is legally obliged to do
so," id. § 140.2, so that "any [form of] conduct tending to create an implication that
the arrested person has a duty to cooperate would be proscribed, and would result in
exclusion." Id. Commentary § 140.2, at 351-52 (emphasis added).
123. 391 A.2d at 1162; accord, White, supra note 76, at 68. But see 446 U.S. at
303 n.9.
124. 446 U.S. at 294.
125. Id. at 316 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Officer McKenna testified:
"If I remember correctly, the vehicle-Innis was placed in it and the vehicle door was closed, and we were waiting for instructions from Captain
Leyden.... At that point, Captain Leyden instructed Patrolman Gleckman
to accompany us. There's usually two men assigned to the wagon, but in this
particular case he wanted a third man to accompany us, and Gleckman got
in the rear seat. In other words, the door was closed. Gleckman opened the
door and got in the vehicle with the subject. Myself, I went over to the
other side and got in the passenger's side in the front."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Appellate Record at 55-56).
126. Innis did not resist arrest.
127. 391 A.2d at 1162-63. Justice Marshall observed:
Gleckman's remarks would obviously have constituted interrogation if
they had been explicitly directed to respondent, and the result should not
be different because they were nominally addressed to McKenna. This is
not a case where police officers speaking among themselves are accidentally
overheard by a suspect. These officers were "talking back and forth" in
close quarters with the handcuffed suspect, traveling past the very place
where they believed the weapon was located. They knew respondent would
hear and attend to their conversation, and they are chargeable with knowledge of and responsibilityfor the pressures to speak which they created.
446 U.S. at 306-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court also found that the content
of the weapons conversation furnished support for the proposition
that the police intended to elicit an incriminating response from
Innis: 128 The "police officers in the wagon chose not to discuss
sports or weather but the crime for which [the] defendant was arrested."'129 Furthermore, the selection of words used by Officer
Gleckman, such as "God forbid" and "little girl,"' 30 are "phrases
[which] seem ideally suited
to an emotional appeal to a suspect's
31
humanitarian impulses."'
It is also arguable that the reason given for the conversation,
concern for the safety of the handicapped children, had no basis in
fact. The chances of injury were remote at best, because the Providence police were in the process of conducting a search for the
missing shotgun.' 32 Even if the search would not have produced
the shotgun, the Providence police had a series of options available. They could have warned the residents of the area about the
danger concerning the missing shotgun, cancelled school for the
handicapped children, cordoned off the vacant field where the
search was being conducted, or assigned extra police to the area
under search. 133
128. 391 A.2d at 1162. Professor White relies on three factors which indicate

that the police intended to elicit an incriminating response: (1) the reasons why the
Rhode Island Supreme Court found that they intended to do so; (2) a genuine concern for the safety of the handicapped children was unfounded because the area was
already under search by the Providence police; and (3) the words actually used by
Officer Gleckman do not sound like the typical language used by officers in general
conversation, but rather like words used to appeal to the conscience of a suspect:
When one considers that the leading police interrogation manual includes
"Appeals to Altruism" as one of the standard interrogation techniques, everything seems to fit together; the officers' conversation (including the use of
emotionally charged terms) was used for the specific purpose of inducing
*thedefendant to disclose the location of the shotgun.
White, supra note 76, at 68-69 (footnote omitted) (citing F. INBAU & J. REID, CalMSNAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs 60 (2d ed. 1967)).
129. 391 A.2d at 1162, quoted in White, supra note 76, at 68.
130. Brief, supra note 60, at 6 (quoting App. Rec. at 43-44, 59); White, supra
note 76, at 68.
131. White, supra note 76, at 68.
132. 446 U.S. at 316 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing White, supra note 76,
at 68).
133. It has also been suggested that
Innis did not have to choose between incriminating himself and disclosing
the weapon's location. There was a third alternative, which Innis almost
surely did not perceive on his own and which he was not apprised of by the
police. Innis could have disclosed the location of the weapon to his counsel
who, under the guise of the attorney-client privilege, could in turn commu-
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The differences in the courts' interpretations of the same facts
in the Innis case serve to illustrate the questions left unanswered
as to the appropriate police conduct in these difficult factual settings, as well as the problems inherent in attempts to re-create
them after the fact. 134 More often than not, "[ilnterrogation takes
place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results
in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation room."' 35 As a result, an accurate re-creation at trial of a
conversation between a suspect and police is often sketchy at
best,' 36 and can never reflect the "subtle messages that can be
communicated through changes in vocal inflection and nonverbal
communication."' 37 Moreover, to accurately re-create the coercive

nicate this information to the appropriate authorities. In this way the threat
posed by the weapon could have been averted without necessitating the
incriminating disclosures which were later used in Innis' trial.
Welch & Collins, A Two-Faced Approach to Miranda, NAT'L L.J., June 16, 1980, at
15, cols. 1, 3.
134. Professor Kamisar examined the inconsistencies and contradictions in
Brewer v. Williams' trial record, and concluded that "any trial of the issue of waiver,
no less than that of coercion-waged by the crude, clumsy method of examination,
cross-examination, and redirect-is almost bound to be unsatisfactory," Kamisar, supra note 31, at 234-35 (footnotes omitted), and that Brewer "illuminate[s] the problem posed by the typical confession case-secret proceedings absent any objective
recordation of the facts." Id. at 233 (footnote omitted). He proposes that all conversations between a suspect and police be electronically recorded. Id.
The Miranda Court was also particularly sensitive to the secrecy surrounding a
custodial confrontation. The Court stated that "[tjhe difficulty in depicting what transpires at such interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they have largely
taken place incommunicado." 384 U.S. at 445; see Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in CriminalDetection, Detention and Trial, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 8 (1966).
135. 384 U.S. at 448.
136. Counsel for Innis arguf-d that the record is incomplete as to the following
facts: (1) the length of the conversation in the police car, Brief, supra note 60, at 18;
(2) the actual words used by the police officers, 446 U.S. at 308 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Appellate Record at 59); Brief, supra, at 18; and (3) the officers did
not testify at trial that the weapons conversation was not intended to elicit an
incriminating response. Brief, supra, at 24-25.
137. White, supra note 25, at 586. Professor Driver observed the following in
connection with the psychological atmosphere in a custodial interrogation environment:
[T]o be physically close is to be psychologically close. The situation has a
structure emphasizing to the persons involved the immediacy of their contact: in an encounter there is an opportunity for uninterrupted verbal communication, a strong awareness of expressive nonverbal signs, the maintenance of poise and a sense of roles, engrossment in the activity at hand, and
an allocation of spatial position.
Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 42,
44-45 (1968) (emphasis added).
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atmosphere present in a custodial confrontation borders on the impossible; 138 yet, for the Innis test to work, these facts are of crucial
importance.139
In addition to the difficulty of applying the Innis standard to
indirect police conduct, the Innis test does not provide objective
guidelines for proper police conduct.' 4 0 Even assuming that practicing lawyers and judges will master the factual intricacies of the
foreseeability standard, the test does not translate into ascertainable rules which police can easily follow. 141
Chief Justice Burger, while concurring in the judgment, readily understood the practical difficulties for police:
It may introduce new elements of uncertainty; under the Court's
test, a police officer in the brief time available, apparently must

evaluate the suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused ...
Few, if any, police officers are competent to make the kind of
evaluation seemingly contemplated; even a psychiatrist asked to
express an expert opinion on these aspects of a suspect in cus-

138. See note 134 supra.
139. See note 114 supra and accompanying text. In United States v. Brown, 557
F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977), Justice Celebrezze described the frightening ordeal of being "taken for a ride" and stated:
The prisoner and police officers are in close contact within a confined area.
Often, the inside door handles are removed and the front and back seats are
separated by wire mesh or a plastic divider. Invariably, the prisoner is handcuffed. He is effectively cut off from the world outside the patrol car. As a
practical matter, he has no access to friends or counsel. If the prisoner has
just been arrested, he may still be disoriented and apprehensive in an often
hostile and alien setting. In short, the back seat of a patrol car as the setting
for a conversation conforms in all respect[s] to the "incommunicado policedominated" atmosphere which led the Supreme Court in Miranda . . . to
recognize the need for special procedures to minimize the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation.
Id. at 551 (citation omitted).
140. "[A] rule that requires [a police officer] to predict how a court may later
rule on the question of causation is not very useful." Graham, supra note 98, at 110.
In discussing the impact of Miranda in 1966, Professor Graham observed:
[T]he police may continue to use their ears as they go about their work, but
...
their own conduct toward persons arrested is circumscribed by the fifth
amendment to those steps necessary to begin the operation of the criminal
process. In short, an understandable set of rules for the police officer can
easily be drafted around the principle that once an officer is justified in
making an arrest, he may no longer use the accused as a source of information and should restrict his conduct to such matters as the law allows in restraining the accused so that his case is presented to the court.
Id.
141. Id.
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tody would very likely employ extensive questioning and observation to make the judgement now charged to police officers.
Trial judges have enough difficulty discerning the bounda-

ries and nuances flowing from 1post-Miranda
opinions, and we do
42
not clarify that situation today.

In Innis, three courts differed as to whether the weapons conversation was an attempt to elicit an incriminating response.' 43 The
courts' dilemma is in itself evidence that a police officer acting in
good faith may have difficulty in applying the Innis test in day-today police work where there is seldom time to stop and ponder
what may be permissible conduct in a custodial confrontation with
a suspect.
TOWARD A WORKABLE STANDARD
The Innis Court's failure to construct guidelines and enumer-

ate the specific factors which have a bearing on foreseeability of police conduct or the susceptibility of a particular suspect to a given
form of persuasion renders the Innis test ambiguous and difficult to

apply. This section will attempt to clarify this ambiguity by constructing criteria for lower court guidance.

The United States Supreme Court in Innis did not enumerate
the factors to rely upon in determining whether the police should
have known that their conduct would elicit an incriminating re-

142. 446 U.S. at 304-05 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted) (footnote omitted).
143. The judge at the suppression hearing thought the weapons conversation
was not an attempt to elicit an incriminating response, but concluded that it was
"'entirely understandable that [the officers] would voice their concern [for the safety
of the handicapped children] to each other.'" 446 U.S. at 303 n.9 (brackets in original) (quoting Shea, J., of Del. Super. Ct.).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court thought the weapons conversation was a deliberate attempt to elicit a response by the use of subtle compulsion. 391 A.2d at
1162. The majority of the United States Supreme Court thought that although subtle
compulsion did exist, the police could not have known that their conduct would
elicit an incriminating response. 446 U.S. at 302-03.
Justices Marshall and Brennan thought that the police officers should have
known that Innis would respond to the weapons conversation. Id. at 305-06
(Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). Justice Stevens concluded that
"there is evidence in the record to support the view that Officer Gleckman's statement was intended to elicit a response from Innis." Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Given the differing opinions of the United States Supreme Court and lower
court justices as to whether the police should have known that their conversation
would elicit an incriminating response, it is hardly realistic to expect the police to
make this determination amidst the confusion accompanying an arrest
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sponse. While the Court did suggest that one factor may be the
length of the conversation between the police and a suspect, 144 the
opinion is silent as to any additional factors. Other criteria may include the content of the conversation or the nature of the police
conduct with particular emphasis on whether the conversation or
conduct by police concerns the alleged crime. For example, in
Innis it is arguable that the content of the conversation between
the officers is the most reliable indicator of whether they should
have known that their conduct would elicit an incriminating response. 145 Not only did the weapons conversation concern the alleged crime, but it placed Innis in the position of having to make
an incriminating statement in order to avert what the police were
describing as a threat to handicapped children. Although the Court
found that it was not foreseeable that this conversation would elicit
an incriminating response, courts should examine the content of
any police conversation concerning the crime, or the circumstances
surrounding the crime, to determine if the police should have
known that their conduct would elicit such a response. The location of the police officers vis-a-vis the suspect is another factor
which should be considered. For example, if police officers initiate
a conversation among themselves which is inadvertantly overheard
by a suspect, any incriminating response could not be a foreseeable
result of police conduct. However, if the conversation occurs in
close proximity to the suspect, it is arguable that it was intended
that the suspect hear the conversation and react. 146
Another weakness of the Innis test is the Court's failure to
enumerate the specific factors which may have a bearing on a particular suspect's susceptibility or suggestibility to a given form of
persuasion. While the Court did state that Innis was not "unusually
disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest,' 147 indicating that

144. See 446 U.S. at 303; text accompanying notes 108-109 supra.

145. See 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.); id. at
312-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. The majority did not attach any significance to the fact that there was
some dispute as to the exact seating arrangements. 446 U.S. at 294 n.1. Apparently,
there was conflicting testimony at the suppression hearing as to where Officer
Gleckman sat. 391 A.2d at 1160 n.2. Officer McKenna testified that Gleckman sat in
the back with Innis. Id. If in fact Gleckman did, the weapons conversation can
hardly be characterized as "offhand remarks," 446 U.S. at 303, because Innis would
have been sitting right next to Gleckman, the officer who initiated the weapons conversation. Id. at 306 n. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing App. Rec. at 50, 52, 56).
147. 446 U.S. at 302-03.
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one factor may be the emotional state of a suspect at the time of
arrest, the opinion is silent as to any additional subjective factors.

In determining whether the police should have known that a particular suspect would be susceptible to a given form of persuasion,
149
148 education,
courts should at least consider the suspect's age,

emotional or mental deficiencies,'

50

religious convictions,' 5 ' and

52

emotional state at the time of arrest.1
Innis creates a gap in situations where a suspect may perceive
he or she is under compulsion to confess and in fact does confess,

although the confession was an unforeseeable result of police conduct. 153 Under Innis, any incriminating statements thus obtained
will be inadmissible in the prosecution's direct case. To illustrate
this point, consider the following hypothetical: Assume that the
Innis Court applied the test correctly 1 54 and that Innis has a young

handicapped daughter. Assume further that the Providence police
do not know that Innis had any children. While in the police
wagon, the officers begin a conversation concerning the safety of
the handicapped children. Upon hearing the weapons conversation,

visions of a handicapped little girl picking up the shotgun and killing herself flash through Innis' mind. He responds to the moral

ploy by telling the officers that he will show them where the shotgun is located.

148. See People v. Bodner, 75 A.D.2d 440, 446, 430 N.Y.S.2d 433, 437 (4th
Dep't 1980) (court considered that 17-year-old defendant had I.Q. of 63 and mental

age of nine).
149. See id.
150. See id. But see United States v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138, 145 (8th Cir. 1980)
(court did not consider that defendant was American Indian with "dull-normal" I.Q.
and fifth-grade education).
151. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 392-93 (court considered fact that defendant was deeply religious); Kamisar, supra note 31, at 221-24.
152. See 446 U.S. at 302-03; text accompanying note 147 supra.
153. See 446 U.S. at 303. The majority explained:
The Rhode Island Supreme Court erred... in equating "subtle compulsion" with interrogation. That the officers' comments struck a responsive
chord is readily apparent. Thus, it may be said, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court said, that the respondent was subjected to "subtle compulsion." But that is not the end of the inquiry. It must also be established that
a suspect's incriminating response was the product of words or actions on
the part of police that they should have known were reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
154. For the argument that this result is not based on an accurate re-creation of
the custodial confrontation between the Providence police and Innis and therefore
subject to criticism, see notes 118-141 supra and accompanying text.
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Although the police do not know of Innis' susceptibility to a
moral appeal to save the life of a handicapped child, for Innis the
weapons conversation produces the same compulsion as direct police questioning: visions of Innis' little handicapped girl picking up
the shotgun and killing herself compel an incriminating response.
Since the police and society at large should not be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of police conduct, Innis correctly
held that an admission produced by unforeseeable police conduct
should be admissible at trial.
Moreover, the foreseeability standard is consistent with the
underlying rationale of Miranda. In Miranda, the Court established safeguards to alleviate the coercive atmosphere inherent in
custodial interrogation. 155 The Court was concerned that the coercive atmosphere created by the combination of custody and interrogation would threaten the privilege against self-incrimination. 15
Miranda, however, was a response to coercive and deceptive forms
of police interrogation used to induce confessions. 1 57 Nowhere in
Miranda did the Court state or even allude to the proposition
that police and society should be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of police conduct. To hold them accountable
would put the courts in a position where a confession in response
to a police officer's statement such as "What is your name?" may
be held inadmissible because a suspect perceived that he was be1 58
ing compelled to confess.
Avoiding the Innis Problem:
Suggestions for Police Procedure
While the Innis test is consistent with the underlying rationale
of Miranda, it is unworkable in situations where the police con155. See note 13 supra.
156. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
157. See sources cited note 25 supra.
158.

The Court made a similar point in Innis:
By way of example, if the police had done no more than drive past the

site of the concealed weapon while taking the most direct route to the police
station, and if the respondent, upon noticing for the first time the proximity

of the school for handicapped children, had blurted out that he would show
the officers where the gun was located, it could not seriously be argued that
this "subtle compulsion" would have constituted "interrogation" within the
meaning of the Miranda opinion.

446 U.S. at 303-04 n.10.
This is consistent with cases holding that routine administrative questions incident to arrest and booking do not constitute interrogation. E.g., Hines v. LaValle, 521
F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976).
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front a suspect indirectly or where a police officer initiates, in the
suspect's presence, a conversation with another officer. 159 Formulation of criteria that courts should consider in determining whether
police conduct constitutes interrogation may serve to clarify Innis'
ambiguities. However, the difficulties inherent in ascertaining the
precise nature of a police-suspect confrontation 60 make it unlikely
that a comprehensive list can be formulated.
To alleviate this difficulty, Professor Kamisar proposes that all
conversations between a suspect and police be electronically recorded. 161 If a judge is provided with an objective record of a
police-suspect confrontation, the Innis test becomes a workable
standard for determining whether police conduct constitutes interrogation. However, while recording is feasible in stationhouse or
police-car settings, it is impractical to require police to carry re159. See notes 106-143 supra and accompanying text.
160. See notes 134-138 supra and accompanying text.

161.

Kamisar, supra note 31, at 233. Other scholars have agreed with his pro-

posal. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 134, at 20. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment

Procedure's reporter acknowledges "a concern about the danger of police abuse
which cannot subsequently be established in court." A MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT, Commentary § 130.4, at
341 (1975). Section 130.4 provides in pertinent part:
(3) Sound Recordings. The regulations relating to sound recordings
shall establish procedures to provide a sound recording of
(a) the warning to arrested persons pursuant to Subsection 130.1(2);
(b) the warning required by, and any waiver of the right to counsel
pursuant to, Section 140.8; and
(c) any questioning of the arrested person and any statement he
makes in response thereto.
Id.
The full § 130.4
requires that law enforcement agencies make full written records and sound
recordings to aid the resolution of factual disputes which may subsequently
arise concerning what happened to an arrested person in custody. Such a
provision is central to the Code's attempt to provide clear and enforceable
rules governing the period between arrest and judicial appearance. The
keeping of such records will assist in a subsequent reconstruction of what
took place.
Id. § 130.4, Note, at 39 (emphasis added).
For analyses of the constitutionality of videotaping confessions, see Hendricks v.
Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc); Barber & Bates, Videotape in
Criminal Proceedings,25 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1974).
For other proposals, see W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT IN SOCIETY (1967);
Friendly, supra note 11; Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy
for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932). For a discussion of the KauperSchaefer-Friendly proposal providing for warnings and questioning by a judicial officer, see Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years
Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15 (1974).
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corders and tape all conversations during and immediately following each arrest. Moreover, while additional criteria may clarify the
Innis test16 2 and objective recording when possible may solve the

difficulties inherent in ascertaining the precise nature of a policesuspect confrontation, 163 the Innis test still does not translate into
rules of conduct that police can easily follow. 64
A per se rule prohibiting the police from making any comments concerning the alleged crime once the suspect has asserted
either his or her right to remain silent dr right to counsel would
provide police with an easy standard to follow in custodial situations and would satisfy the dual goals advocated in Miranda and
Innis of protecting the suspect's fifth amendment rights while at
the same time not impeding the efficient investigation of crime.
This standard not only would give greater assurance that the suspect's Miranda rights are protected, but also would remedy the
problem now faced by lower courts burdened with the difficulty of
applying the Innis test to indirect or ambiguous police conversations. All that would be required is a determination of whether the
conversation was related to the alleged crime. It would not be necessary for the court to make a case-by-case determination of what
the police should or should not have known. In addition a per se
rule would deter ambiguous police conduct that might or might not
constitute interrogation under the Innis test, while not in fact hampering legal police activity in any significant manner. It is arguable
that there is no reason for the police to discuss an alleged crime in
the suspect's presence unless they hope to elicit some incriminating response, 165 a goal which is in violation of the foreseeability
162. See notes 144-152 supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.

164. See text accompanying notes 140-143 supra.
165. Captain Leaming reminisced about his Brewer v. Williams Christian burial speech nine years after the event
"'I didn't even know what those words ['psychological coercion']
meant, until I looked them up in the dictionary after I was accused of using
it. ..

Shucks, I was just being a good old-fashioned cop, the only kind I know

how to be....
I have never seen a prisoner physically abused, though I heard about
those things in the early days....
That type of questioning just doesn't work. They'll just resist harder.
You have to butter 'em up, sweet talk 'em, use that-what's the
word?--"psychological coercion ....
Kamisar, supra note 21, at 1 (brackets in original) (reprinting in part Lamberto,
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standard of Innis. Thus, requiring the police to refrain from discussing the alleged crime until the suspect waives his or her
Miranda rights, 166 or has an attorney present, would not place undue hardship on legitimate police investigative methods. Such a
rule would eliminate the risk and uncertainty that a police officer
faces in attempting to comply with the foreseeability standard of
Innis:167 all conversation relating to the alleged crime would be
prohibited.
This proposal is also consistent with the Miranda standard that
"[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present"'168 or "[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease." 169 In further defining the permissible scope of police conduct once a suspect has asserted his or her right to remain silent,
the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosely 170 stated that the admissibility of incriminating statements thus obtained "depends . . . on
Leaming's "Speech": "I'd do it again," Des Moines Reg., Apr. 7, 1977, § B, at 1,
col. 1 (quoting Captain Leaming)).
166. For a brief discussion of the issue of waiver, see note 79 supra. Alternatively, a court can adopt the New York waiver rule articulated in People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980) (once a suspect requests the assistance of counsel, he cannot waive this right without counsel present).
167. A major risk faced by police officers attempting to comply with the
foreseeability standard is that valuable evidence may be suppressed if a court finds
that the evidence was the result of a conversation the police should have known
would elicit an incriminating response.
168. 384 U.S. at 474.
169. Id.at 473-74.
170. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Mosley was arrested for two robberies and asserted his
Miranda rights. Id. at 97. A few hours later he was warned and questioned by another detective concerning a different crime. Id. at 98. Mosley waived his rights,
and, as a result of the second interrogation, a confession was obtained. Id. At issue
was the interpretation of a passage in Miranda which states that "'[o]nce warnings
have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.' 'Id. at 100-01 (quoting 384 U.S. at 473-74).
Mosley interpreted this passage as not precluding "a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject,
once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent," id. at 102-03
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted), and held that the initial request to stop the
interrogation was "scrupulously honored" since the first police officer immediately
ceased interrogating Mosley. Id. at 104 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the second
interrogation commenced only after a few hours had passed and new warnings had
been given, and was restricted to a different crime. Id. at 106. Thus, the confession
was admissible because the procedures outlined in Miranda were followed. Id. at
107.
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whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.' "171 A rule prohibiting the police from making any comments related to the alleged crime once a suspect has asserted his
or her Miranda rights would be consistent with the "scrupulously
honored" requirements of Mosely and Miranda.
There is precedent for the argument that a per se standard to
which the police can easily adhere should replace Innis' case-bycase foreseeability approach. In Gideon v. Wainwright,172 the Supreme Court, addressing the sixth amendment right to counsel,
shifted from a case-by-case approach to a per se rule that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel. 173 Prior to Gideon
the Court had used a "fundamental fairness" standard l74 where,
under a totality-of-circumstances approach, judges determined
whether the defendant would be deprived of a fair hearing if he or
she did not have an attorney present.175
Courts found the totality-of-circumstances test "substantially
unworkable"'176 because the standard
did not establish a definite set of rules for state courts whereby
they could know whether in any given case refusal to appoint

counsel would be held to be a denial of due process by the Supreme Court. The only guidance was that a defendant must be
given a fair trial, thus leaving the standard "impossibly vague

and unpredictable." 177

Analogously, courts applying the Innis foreseeability standard will
not be able to ascertain whether the police should have known that
their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Furthermore, Innis' failure to enumerate specific
factors that may have a bearing on a particular suspect's susceptibility adds further confusion to a standard that could also be called
vague and unpredictable.1 78
171.

Id. at 104 (footnote omitted).

172.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

173. Id. Gideon extended the right to counsel to non-capital offenses. Id. In
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court further extended the sixth
amendment right to counsel to all prosecutions that could result in imprisonment.
174. This approach was adopted in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
175. See id.
176. Case Note, 15 ALA. L. REv. 568, 568 (1963).
177., See Comment, Right of Indigent Defendants to Counsel in State CourtsGideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 43 B.U. L. REv. 570, 573 (1963) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 517 (1962)).
178. See text accompanying notes 134-143 supra.
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CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION REDEFINED

In Gideon, the Supreme Court abandoned the totality-ofcircumstances test and adopted a clear and simple rule requiring
that all indigent defendants have counsel appointed. 179 Similarly,
the Innis foreseeability standard should be replaced by a clear and
simple rule prohibiting the police from making any comments related to the alleged crime until the suspect either waives his or her
Miranda rights or has an attorney present during questioning.
CONCLUSION

In holding that conduct the police knew or should have known
was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response constitutes
interrogation in violation of a suspect's Miranda rights, the United
States Supreme Court in Innis apparently provided custodial suspects with an objective standard of protection. However, the
Court's failure to enunciate the factors a court should examine to
determine whether the police knew or should have known that
their conduct would elicit an incriminating response will make it
difficult for the courts to apply the standard uniformly and for the
police to tailor their conduct so as to avoid the exclusion of evidence resulting from unintentional Miranda violations. Unless
workable criteria can be established to provide guidance for the
courts and law enforcement officers, the adoption of a per se rule
that all police conversations concerning the alleged crime or the
circumstances surrounding the crime are prohibited after a suspect
has asserted his or her right to remain silent or right to an attorney
would provide a standard which would be easy for the police and
the courts to follow. At the same time, it would advance the goal of
Miranda and Innis that a suspect not be intimidated into incriminating himself in a custodial setting-without hampering legitimate police investigation.
Alan M. Schutzman

179. See notes 172-177 supra and accompanying text.
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